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KEEPING PROMISES: AN EXAMINATION OF CHARTER 
SCHOOLS' VULNERABILITY TO CLAIMS FOR 
EDUCATIONAL LIABILITY 
Julie F. Mead· and Preston C. Green, Ill* 
Legal commentators have regularly argued that public ele-
mentary and secondary schools should be subject to educa-
tional liability for failing to educate, and for failing to identify 
learning disabilities of individual students. 1 However, since the 
California Supreme Court's rejection of educational liability in 
Peter W. v. San Francisco School District,2 the judiciary has 
uniformly refused to hold school districts liable for the failure 
to meet the educational needs of students. Courts have consis-
tently rejected educational liability claims based on both tort 
and statutory theories. 3 Some suggest that arguments based on 
constitutional theories would fare no better.4 
* Assistant Professor, Department of Educational Administration, University of 
Wisconsin-Madison. Ph.D., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1994. 
** Department of Educational Policy, Research, and Administration, School of 
Education, University of Massachusetts, Amherst. 
1. See e.g., John G. Culhane, Reinvigorating Educational Malpractice Claims: A 
Representational Focus, 67 Wash. L. Rev. 349 (1992); Catherine D. McBride, Educa-
tional Malpractice: Judicial Recognition Of A Limited Duty Of Educators Toward Indi-
vidual Students; A State Law Cause Of Action For Educational Negligence, 1990 U. Ill. 
L. Rev. 4 75 (1990); Kevin P. McJessy, Contract Law: The Proper Framework for Litigat· 
ing Educational Liability Claims, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1768 (1995); Cheryl L. Wade, 
Educators Who Drive With No Hands: The Application of Analytical Concepts of Corpo· 
rate Law in Certain Cases of Educational Malpractice, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 437 
(1995). 
2. 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976). 
3. See e.g., Bell v. Board ofEduc. of West Haven, 739 A.2d 321 (Conn. App. Ct. 
1999); Brantley v. District of Columbia, 640 A.2d 181, 184 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Doe v. 
Town of Framingham, 965 F. Supp. 226 (D. Mass. 1997); Donohue v. Copiague Union 
Free Sch. Dist., 391 N.E.2d 1352 (N.Y. 1979); D.S.W. v. Fairbanks N. State Borough 
Sch. Dist., 628 P.2d 554 (Alaska 1981); Helm v. Professional Children's Sch., 431 
N.Y.S.2d 246 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980). Hunter v. Board ofEduc., 439 A.2d 582 (Md. 1982); 
Hoffman v. Board ofEduc., 400 N.E.2d 317 (N.Y. 1979); Loughran v. Flanders, 470 F. 
Supp. 110 (D. Conn. 1979); Paladino v. Adelphi Univ., 454 N.Y.S.2d 868 (App. Div. 
1982); Peter W., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 854; Sellers v. School Bd. of Manassas, Virginia, 960 
F.Supp. 1006 (E.D.Va. 1997). 
4. McJessy, supra note 1. 
35 
36 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2001 
Charter schools, however, might be susceptible to educa-
tional liability claims because the rationales used by courts to 
reject liability in the cases of conventional public elementary 
and secondary institutions arguably do not apply to them. For 
instance, charter schools might be vulnerable to causes of ac-
tion based on contract. law because the charter school-parent 
relationship is more contractual in nature than the relation-
ship between conventional schools and parents.5 In addition, 
charter schools might be susceptible to statutory liability be-
cause the charter school legislation makes it perfectly clear 
that the charter schools have a mandatory duty to meet the 
goals established in the statutes. 
This article examines whether charter schools might be 
vulnerable to educational liability claims based on contractual 
and statutory liability. The first section provides a review of 
judicial opinions regarding educational liability claims based 
on tort, statutory, and contract constitutional theories. This 
section also examines the arguments put forward by legal 
commentators regarding educational liability in traditional 
school settings. The second section describes the particulars of 
charter schools and the statutes and contracts that bind them. 
Particular attention is paid to the range and types of commit-
ments these schools make to their students and their parents 
and the differences between charter and traditional public 
schools. The third section analyzes why an educational liability 
claim against a charter school based on contract law and/or 
statutory terms might be successful. 
I. THEORIES OF ESTABLISHING THE EDUCATIONAL LIABILITY 
OF CONVENTIONAL PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
Educational liability claims have been filed or suggested 
under four general theories: tort theory, statutory theory, con-
stitutional theory, and contract theory. As the discussion below 
will illustrate, the first three have been applied and rejected in 
traditional public school settings by numerous courts. The final 
5. Jennifer T. Wall, The Establishment of Charter Schools: A Guide to Legal Is-
sues for Legislatures, 1998 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 69 (1998). Wall expands on McJessy's 
argument, supra note 1, that contract law should be the proper framework for analyz-
ing educational liability claims, by noting that charter schools might also be susceptible 
to such claims. This article expands upon the framework developed by Wall and 
McJessy in Section III. 
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category, contract theory, has met with limited success but only 
in the private school or university setting. 
A Tort Theory 
Most educational liability challenges have been based on 
tort theory. There are two types of tort challenges: negligence 
and misrepresentation. Educational liability claims based on 
negligence require the plaintiffs to prove duty, breach of duty, 
causation, and injury.6 The courts have uniformly rejected edu-
cational liability claims based on negligence. Several courts 
have cited the difficulty of establishing a standard of care on 
the part of the schools. In Peter W., for example, the California 
Court of Appeals refused to recognize a cause of action sound-
ing in negligence, in part, because "classroom methodology af-
fords no readily acceptable standards of care."7 Establishing 
causation is another problem. As the Peter W. court explained, 
physical, emotional, and environmental factors outside the con-
trol of the schools might affect a student's academic achieve-
ment.8 Moreover, several courts have questioned whether stu-
dents alleging educational liability suffer from injuries for 
which monetary damages can be awarded.9 The appropriate 
remedy for educational injury is remedial training, not mone-
tary damages. 10 Additionally, defenses to negligence claims, 
such as contributory negligence, may bar students from obtain-
. d 11 mg a reme y. 
Courts have also cited several public policy reasons for re-
jecting educational liability claims based on negligence. First, 
the recognition of such claims would force the judiciary to re-
view the day-to-day decision-making of public schools. 12 Second, 
courts do not wish to subject schools to extra financial bur-
dens.13 Third, the recognition of negligence claims could result 
6. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS§ 30 
(5th ed. 1984). 
7. Peter W., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 860. 
8. Id. at 861. 
9. Hunter, 439 A.2d at 585. 
10. Thomas G. Eschweiler, Educational Malpractice in Sex Education, 49 SMU L. 
REV. 101 (1995). 
11. McJessy, supra note 1. 
12. Donohue, 391 N.E.2d at 1354. 
13. Peter W., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861. 
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in a flood of litigation.14 Fourth, courts have claimed that the 
proper avenue for dispute resolution is through administrative 
agencies that have been established by the educational institu-
t . 15 lOllS. 
Plaintiffs have also raised educational liability challenges 
based on a misrepresentation theory. There are two types of 
misrepresentation claims: negligent misrepresentation, and in-
tentional misrepresentation. An action for negligent misrepre-
sentation arises when the defendant, owing a duty of care to 
the plaintiff, makes a false statement, the defendant intends 
for the plaintiff to rely on the false statement, and as a result of 
the reliance, the plaintiff suffers injury. 16 An action for inten-
tional misrepresentation arises when the defendant intends to 
make a false statement to a particular person with the intent 
that it convey a certain meaning and that it be believed and 
acted upon by the person to whom it is made. 17 The judiciary 
has generally rejected negligent misrepresentation actions for 
the same public policy reasons as reiecting educational mal-
practice claims based on negligence. 1 Establishing an inten-
tional misrepresentation cause of action is difficult because: (1) 
an honest belief by an educator that a representation is accu-
rate negates the claim; and (2) even if the intent-to-deceive 
element is shown, the plaintiff must still prove the student re-
lied on the representation and the reliance was justifiable un-
der the circumstances. 19 
B. Statutory Theory 
The failure of educational liability claims based on negli-
gence and misrepresentation has forced plaintiffs to develop 
other theories for educational liability claims. One theory is 
based on state educational statutes: plaintiffs argue that state 
statutory schemes have established a standard of care, and 
that the school district has failed to comply with this standard. 
However, the courts have generally refused to recognize educa-
tional liability claims based on the state's statutory duty. In Pe-
14. Donohue, 391 N.E.2d at 1354. 
15. Brantley, 640 A.2d at 184. 
16. KEETON ET AL., supra note 6, at 107. 
17. ld. 
18. Peter W., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 862. 
19. Eschweiler, supra note 10. 
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ter W., for example, the California Court of Appeals found that 
state statutes did not create a "mandatory duty" for school dis-
tricts to protect against injury, but were rather conceived "as 
provisions directed to the attainment of optimum educational 
results."20 In D.S. W. v. Fairbanks North State Borough School 
District, 21 the Supreme Court of Alaska refused to find that its 
special education statute imposed liability on a school district 
because the state legislature did not intend statutes to provide 
parents with remedies for damages. 22 Moreover, the courts 
have held that the same public policy reasons that apply to re-
jecting educational malpractice claims based on negligence also 
23 
apply to such charges based on statutes. 
However, in B.M v. State,24 the Montana Supreme Court 
held that a duty of care existed for a child in the testing and 
placement in a special educational program. The court found 
that the sources of duty were the state's constitutional provi-
sion of education for all citizens, the mandatory attendance 
statute to implement the constitutional guarantee, and admin-
istrative statutes that outline procedures to be followed by in-
dividual school districts in administering special education 
programs. Still, B.M. seems to be a singular exception in the 
litany of educational malpractice cases based on statutory the-
ory. 
Yet, none of these cases were litigated during the current 
educational policy context that focuses so heavily on account-
ability. Speaking of traditional public schools, Paul Weckstein 
argues that public policy may have actually shifted to "counte-
nanc[e]" educational liability on statutory grounds.25 He rea-
sons that the proliferation of state statutes specifying profes-
sional standards for teachers, performance standards for 
students and an increasing emphasis on high-stakes testing 
may now sufficiently delineate a duty and define causation. Of 
the public policy arguments, he writes: 
Policy arguments about the danger of putting public fiscal re-
20. Peter W., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 862. 
21. 628 P.2d 554 (Alaska 1981). 
22. !d. at 556. 
23. !d. 
24. 200 Mont. 58, 649 P.2d 425 (1981). 
25. "School Reform and Enforceable Rights to Quality Education" in Law and 
School Reform: Six Strategies for Promoting Educational Equity, Jay P. Heubert, editor 
(1999). Yale University Press, pp. 306-389 at 356. 
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sources in jeopardy also seem less convincing, particularly in 
instances of long-term breach of educational duties resulting 
in injuries to children that cannot otherwise be fully compen-
sated. The public has strong interests in assuring high-
quality education, avoiding these harms, and ensuring that 
its resources are not wasted on failing programs and prac-
tices.26 
C. Constitutional Theory 
Commentators have suggested that state and federal con-
stitutions provide a duty to educate, the violation of which 
could lead to an educational liability claim. In San Antonio 
School District v. Rodriguez,27 the Supreme Court effectively 
invalidated the United States Constitution as a vehicle for as-
serting an educational malpractice claim. In Rodriguez, the 
Supreme Court found that funding disparities created by prop-
erty taxes were constitutional pursuant to the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In reaching this conclu-
sion, the Court found that education was not a fundamental 
right under the Constitution.28 This negation effectively pre-
cludes a plaintiff from claiming that the Constitution provides 
29 
a mandatory duty to educate. 
Plaintiffs would also have a difficult time asserting that 
state constitutional provisions provide parents of students with 
an enforceable duty to educate. First, state constitutional pro-
visions are so broadly drafted that courts may interpret them 
as expressing a general goal of public policy, rather than as 
conferring specifically enforceable rights. 30 Second, courts may 
find that constitutional provisions are unenforceable mandates 
that must be implemented through statutory provisions. 31 
D. Contract Theory 
Kevin McJessy argues forcefully that children attending 
public schools should be able to base their educational liability 
26. I d. at 357. 
27. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
28. Id. at 29-39. 
29. Culhane, supra note 1. 
30. McJessy, supra note 1. 
31. !d. 
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claims on contract law.32 A contract is defined as "a promise, or 
a set of promises, that the law will enforce or at least recognize 
in some way."33 McJessy describes three theories of educational 
liability under contract law: (1) implied or express contract, (2) 
third-party beneficiary, and (3) promissory estoppel.34 
To establish the breach of an implied or express contract, a 
plaintiff must establish six elements: (1) mutual assent, (2) 
consideration, (3) two or more contracting parties, (4) suffi-
ciently definite to determine a breach, (5) legal capacity to en-
ter into a contract, and (6) no legal prohibition precluding the 
formation of a contract.35 In the public school context, the 
plaintiff might assert that the school promised to provide a 
minimal level of education either implicitly, through the goals 
inherent in the educational process3 or expressly, through 
statutory or constitutional provisions. 6 In return, the plaintiff 
alleges that he promised not to seek private education as con-
sideration.37 In the alternative, the plaintiff may assert that 
school attendance constitutes sufficient consideration. 38 
In the conventional public school context, the implied con-
tractual approach suffers from two major weaknesses. First, a 
plaintiff would have difficulty establishing offer and acceptance 
because mandatory laws requiring students to attend school 
make it difficult to establish mutual assent. 39 Second, a plain-
tiff might not be able to establish the existence of considera-
tion, or "bargained-for exchange."40 Because states provide pub-
lic education free of cost to each individual student, a student 
cannot allege attendance as consideration.41 
Under the second approach, the plaintiff would claim that 
the school district and the teachers enter into a contract with 
the students as third party beneficiaries. 42 A plaintiff would as-
sert that the teacher-school board agreement serves as the con-
32. McJessy, supra note 1. 
33. E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS§ 1.1 (1982). 
34. McJessy, supra note 1. 
35. ld. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. ld. 
39. ld. 
40. Id. 
41. ld. 
42. ld. 
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tract on which educational liability could be established.43 In 
addition, policies and regulations promulgated by the school 
board could serve as implied terms in the teachers' contract.44 A 
plaintiff would further assert that the agreement would require 
the school either to place students in the proper educational 
program or to refrain from promoting students who fail to meet 
the legally imposed requirements. 45 
There are two major obstacles that must be overcome in or-
der for a court to recognize an educational malpractice claim on 
the part of a third-party beneficiary. The first obstacle is the 
general reluctance of the courts to accord third parties benefits 
in connection with governmental contracts.46 However, courts 
are more likely to recognize third-party beneficiary claims if: 
(1) consequential damages are not involved, so that the promi-
sor's risk is more limited;47 (2) the contract is one to perform a 
duty that the government owes to members of the public; 48 or 
(3) the duty assumed by the promisor has been narrowed from 
a general duty to the public to a specific duty to a small group 
of individuals. 49 A plaintiff would also have to convince a court 
not to reject a third-party beneficiary claim due to the public 
policy reasons used to reject educational liability claims under 
other legal theories. 5° 
The third approach, promissory estoppel, has an advantage 
over the other two approaches because the absence of contrac-
tual elements does not foreclose recovery.51 Promissory estoppel 
is defined as: 
43. McJessy, supra note 1. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 33, at§ 10.4. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Torres u. Little Flower Children's Services, 64 N.Y.2d 119, 474 N.E.2d 223 
(1984), stands for this proposition. In Torres, a functionally illiterate former student 
sued a childcare agency that had entered into a contractual agreement with a city gov-
ernmental agency to educate him. The Court of Appeals of New York rejected the stu-
dent's contractual claim because it "could not overcome the policy objections to the 
courts' involvement in these matters." 474 N.E.2d at 227. The dissent countered: 
"[T]here is ample proof, when measured against the obligations of the municipal defen-
dants under statute and regulation, and of defendant Little Flower, under statute, 
regulation and contract of which plaintiff was the third-party beneficiary, to require 
denial of defendants' motions." I d. at 228. 
51. McJessy, supra note 1. 
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A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to in-
duce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial char-
acter on the part of the promisee and which does induce such 
action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided 
only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for 
breach may be limited as justice requires.52 
43 
A parent might have more success with a promissory estop-
pel claim than the other contractual approaches because the 
parent merely has to show that she relied on the promises 
made by the school or school district, and that the school or 
school district had reason to expect reliance, instead of having 
to establish consideration. 53 Additionally, the parents would 
not have to establish that they were intended beneficiaries, as 
is the case with third-party beneficiary claims. 54 However, the 
parents might find establishing reliance in the context of a 
conventional public school difficult: because attendance to the 
conventional public school is based on school zoning regula-
tions, schools may not have any incentive to make any state-
ments that would induce reliance on the part of the parent to 
choose a particular school. 
In other educational contexts, such as student-university 
relationships and student-private school relationships, courts 
have been more willing to find that an implied or express con-
tract exists, thus entitling students to damages awards. In the 
student-university relationship, the first element for proving 
the existence of an implied or express contract is mutual as-
sent. This is established when the university extends an offer 
of admission that is accepted by the applicant. 55 As considera-
tion, the student foregoes offers from other universities. The 
difficulty arises in determining the terms of the agreement that 
are sufficiently certain for establishing a contractual relation-
ship. Ross v. Creighton Universit/6 provides guidance in mak-
ing this determination. In Ross, the Seventh Circuit examined 
the claim brought by a Creighton University student (Ross) 
who was on scholarship to play on the men's basketball team. 
Realizing that Ross' academic preparation was far below that of 
the average Creighton student, the university induced him to 
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 91(1) (1981). 
53. McJessy, supra note 1. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. 957 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992). 
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attend by assuring Ross that he "would receive a meaningful 
education while at Creighton."57 However, after four years at 
the university, Ross had the language skills of a fourth grader 
and the reading skills of a seventh-grader. 58 Ross sued the uni-
versity alleging liability under tort law, and breach of contract. 
The Seventh Circuit dismissed the educational liability claim 
based on negligence,59 but found that a viable breach of con-
tract claim had been made. 60 In reaching its decision, the court 
found that Ross had identified specific promises that could 
serve as a sufficient foundation upon which to bring a breach of 
t l . 61 con ract c mm. 
In a more recent hi~her education case, Gupta u. New Brit-
ain General Hospital, the Supreme Court of Connecticut, 
while rejecting the student's claim, explained that there are "at 
least two situations wherein courts will entertain a cause of ac-
tion for institutional breach of contract for educational ser-
vices."63 The first would involve "a showing that the educa-
tional program failed in some fundamental respect" and the 
second would "arise if the educational institution failed to ful-
fill a specific contractual promise distinct from any overall obli-
gation to offer a reasonable program." 64 
An implied or express contract also exists between students 
and private elementary and secondary schools. The first ele-
ment, mutual assent, is established when the private school ex-
tends an offer to educate the student for a fee, which is ac-
cepted. 65 As consideration, the student foregoes other 
57. !d. at 411. 
58. /d. at 412. 
59. !d. at 414-15. 
60. !d. at 416-17. 
61. !d. at 417. 
62. 687 A.2d Ill (Conn. 1996). 
63. /d. at 120. 
64. !d. In fact, a recent case was brought by parents of children in a New Haven 
elementary school alleging that their traditional public school had failed the children 
under the first Gupta exception. The school had instituted a teaching methodology 
called the "responsive classroom method" that the parents claimed was responsible for 
the deterioration of student discipline and the creation of an unsafe learning environ-
ment. It was the only school in the district employing the methodology. The court re-
jected the claim since the complaint "sounds in tort, not breach of contract." However, 
the court reiterated the two "Gupta exceptions" as proper theories for bringing educa-
tional liability claims. Bell, 739 A.2d 321. 
65. McJessy, supra note 1. 
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educational opportunities, including public schooling.66 Squires 
v. Sierra Nevada Educational Foundation, Inc. 67 demonstrates 
that this contractual relationship might also expose private, 
elementary and secondary schools to breach of contract claims. 
In Squires, the parents chose to send their son Brandon to 
Cambridge School because they suspected that he might have 
difficulties learning to read. 68 The principal advised the Squires 
that Cambridge "had the capabilities and the facilities to diag-
nose and remediate any reading difficulties which might de-
velop,"69 and employed a "highly qualified" stafr_1° The Squires 
enrolled Brandon in Cambridge, and for four years (pre-
kindergarten through second grade) he received positive pro-
gress reports. 71 However, in the fourth quarter of the second 
grade, the school reported that Brandon's reading ability was 
significantly below grade level, and that he needed to repeat 
the second grade.72 The Squires sued Cambridge for breach of 
contract, alleging that Brandon was taught by inexperienced 
interns, rather than highly qualified staff.73 Additionally, the 
Squires obtained an affidavit from a reading expert that Bran-
don's reading deficiencies "were more likely than not the result 
of inappropriate instruction and intervention during Brandon's 
four years at Cambridge School."74 The court concluded that the 
contract between the parent and the school "sufficiently par-
ticularized services to support a claim for breach of contract."75 
II. DESCRIPTION OF CHARTER SCHOOLS 
There is no doubt that charter schools have altered the edu-
cational landscape since the various cases described above were 
litigated. Charter schools, although public schools, differ from 
traditional public schools in that they must commit themselves 
to educational outcomes by means of a charter contract. In ad-
66. !d. 
67. 107 Nev. 902, 823 P.2d 256 (1991). 
68. !d. 
69. !d. 
70. !d. 
71. !d. 
72. !d. 
73. !d. at 257. 
74. !d. 
75. !d. 
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dition, these schools have no natural student population from 
which to draw. Rather, they must entice parents to enroll their 
children. 76 Parents then use the equivalent of a "voucher" from 
the state to pay for the child's education.77 
As of this writing, thirty-five states plus the District of Co-
lumbia and Puerto Rico make provision for charter schools.78 
These special public schools are constituted by means of a char-
ter contract between a designated chartering authority and 
those who wish to operate a school. The particulars regarding 
how and under what circumstances a charter school may bees-
tablished vary from state to state. For example, some states al-
low only school districts to charter schools.79 Others require RR-
plicants to seek approval from the state educational agency.80 
Still others extend chartering authority to universities.81 Fi-
nally, the State of Wisconsin has granted chartering authority 
to the City of Milwaukee.82 Charter school statutes also vary 
according to the number that may be established in a given 
time frame, 83 whether private schools may convert to public 
charter school status, 84 and the length of time a charter may be 
85 granted. 
However, even with this variability, charter schools have 
several characteristics in common. First of all, charters are 
granted in a quid pro quo attempt to reform education. States 
76. Some state statutes explicitly state that no child can be compelled to attend a 
charter school. See e.g., WIS. STAT. §118.40(6). 
77. These "voucher" amounts are calculated based upon the state's per/pupil aid 
formula. 
78. Those states are: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecti-
cut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachu-
setts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jer-
sey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See the 
US Charter Schools home page for information on the charter school movement in the 
United States. See U.S. Charter Schools (Jan. 17, 2001) 
<http://www. uscharterschools.orgl>. 
79. For example: California, Colorado. 
80. For example: Massachusetts, North Carolina. 
81. For example: Michigan, Wisconsin. 
82. See Wrs STAT. 118.40(2r). 
83. For example: Alaska limits the number of charter schools to 30 statewide 
(ALASKA STAT. §14.03.250 (Michie 1995)) . 
84. For example: Wisconsin, Arizona, Michigan allow conversion, while New York 
does not. 
85. Most charters are granted from 3-5 years. Arizona grants the longest char-
ters, which may be given for a period of 15 years. 
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relieve charter schools of certain state laws and regulations in 
exchange for the charter school's commitment by means of a 
contract to specific outcomes. Charter schools may not charge 
tuition, but utilize per pupil state aid dollars to fund their ef-
forts. Schools must outline their mission and curricular focus 
and undergo some sort of review process to determine whether 
they have sufficiently mapped out their program to qualify for 
charter school status. Once those proposing a school have ade-
quately justified their educational plan to the chartering en-
tity,86 they must enter into a contract to deliver those services 
to the children who will elect to attend. 
Charter school statutes dictate the required content of char-
ter school applications and contracts. Table 1 quotes statutord;' 
language related to student outcomes from five state statutes. 
As noted, while charter statutes may free charter schools from 
some of the rules and regulations binding traditional public 
schools, they are held bound to the academic standards estab-
lished by that state. Most states also require charter schools to 
participate in any statewide achievement or proficiency testing. 
In addition, as the language below illustrates, charter schools 
must carefully delineate their educational plans and must spec-
ify precise educational goals for their students and the means 
by which progress toward those goals will be established. 
86. State Educational Agency, school district, university, or other entity desig-
nated with chartering authority by statute. 
87. These five states were selected as exemplars: Minnesota has the oldest char-
ter school statute (1991); Arizona and California have chartered the most schools; 
Michigan was the first, and at this time, only, state to grant chartering authority to 
universities; Wisconsin was the first to grant chartering authority to a municipality. 
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Table 1: Examples of statutory language related to Student 
Outcomes 
Arizona 4. That it designs a method to measure pupil 
progress, toward the pupil outcomes adopted by the 
state board of education pursuant to section 15-
741.01 including participation m the Arizona 
instrument to measure standards test and the 
nationally standardized norm-referenced 
achievement test as designated by the state board 
and the completion and distribution of an annual 
report card as prescribed in chapter 7, article 3 of this 
title. 
California (A) A description of the educational program of the 
school, designed, among other things, to identify 
those whom the school is attempting to educate, what 
it means to be an "educated person" in the 21st 
century, and how learning best occurs. The goals 
identified in that program shall include the objective 
of enabling pupils to become self-motivated, 
competent, and lifelong learners. 
(B) The measurable pupil outcomes identified for use 
by the charter school. "Pupil outcomes," for purposes 
of this part, means the extent to which all pupils of 
the school demonstrate that they have attained the 
skills, knowledge, and attitudes specified as goals in 
the school's educational program. 
(C) The method by which pupil progress in meeting 
those pupil outcomes is to be measured. 
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(ii) A copy of the educational goals of the public school 
academy and the curriculum to be offered and 
methods of pupil assessment to be used by the public 
school academy. To the extent applicable, the 
progress of the pupils in the public school academy 
shall be assessed using at least a Michigan education 
assessment program (MEAP) test or an assessment 
instrument developed under section 104a of the state 
school aid act of 1979, being section 388.1704a of the 
Michigan Compiled Laws, for a state-endorsed high 
school diploma, or 1 or more of the following 
nationally normed tests: the California achievement 
test, the Stanford achievement test, or the 
Iowa test of basic skills. 
Minnesota 2) specific outcomes pupils are to achieve under 
Wisconsin 
subdivision 10; 
Subd. 10. Pupil performance. A charter school must 
design its programs to at least meet the outcomes 
adopted by the state board for public school students. 
In the absence of state board requirements, the school 
must meet the outcomes contained in the contract 
with the sponsor. The achievement levels of the 
outcomes contained in the contract may exceed the 
achievement levels of any outcomes adopted by the 
state board for public school students. 
3. A description of the educational program of the 
school. 
4. The methods the school will use to enable pupils to 
attain the educational goals under s. 118.01. 
5. The method by which pupil progress in attaining 
the educational goals under s. 118.01 will be 
measured.88 
Michigan provides an interesting example of precisely de-
fining students' educational success. For example, a guide for 
those seeking charter school status from Central Michigan 
88. WIS. STAT. § 118.40 (2)(d) requires that "the chartering or contracting en-
tity ... shall ... Administer the examinations under ss. 118.30 (1m) and 121.02 (1) (r) 
to pupils enrolled in charter schools under this sub-section." 
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University requires that applications describe: 
• Specific performance indicators 
• Use the MEAP (Michigan Educational Assessment 
Program)/HSPT (High School Proficiency Test) 
• Use a nationally norm-referenced achievement test 
• State specific timelines for success 
• State who must accomplish the goal, what is to be 
accomplished, how success is to be measured and 
when it is to be accomplished.89 
This guide also provides samples of academic goals. For in-
stance: 
• Academic achievement will increase for all students 
in the areas of math, science, reading and social 
studies. This will be measured by 70% of all1"t grade 
students scoring at or above grade level on the total 
battery score of the Metropolitan Achievement Test 
by June 2000. 
• Students will be able to read effectively. This will be 
measured by 90% of all 2001 graduates scoring at 
the proficiency level on the High School Proficiency 
Test in 11th grade on the Informational Reading sec-
tion.90 
The import of such specificity relates to another shared 
characteristic of all charter schools. Charter schools are all sub-
ject to performance reviews and failure to perform satisfacto-
rily may result in revocation or non-renewal of the charter. Al-
though specific standards for revocation and/or non-renewal 
vary, all states condition the continuance of a charter on the at-
tainment of particular performance indicators. Some statutes 
specify grounds for non-renewal and revocation. 91 Some simply 
89. CENTRAL MICIIIGAN UNIVERSITY & CHARTER SCHOOLS: A COMMITMENT TO 
STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT, PHASE II APPLICATION TO CHARTER FOR 1999-2000, 3 (2000). 
90. !d. 
91. For example California specifies the following grounds for revocation: 
(a) Gross financial mismanagement that jeopardizes the financial stability of the 
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note that non-renewal or revocation may occur for failure to 
fulfill the obligations of the contract. 92 So whether the student 
performance indicators are required in the application or the 
contract itself, a charter school's existence is predicated on the 
achievement of those articulated goals. Failure to provide an 
educational environment in which students attain this goal 
may result in revocation of the charter. Therefore, it could be 
argued that each charter school contract is a compact that 
binds the school to certain student outcomes in exchange for 
the state educational funds provided through the contract. In 
fact, the United States Department of Education lists "failure 
to meet student achievement goals and expectations" as one of 
the three most frequent rationales for charter revocation. 93 
As mentioned earlier, charter schools must compete for stu-
dents. Therefore, promotional literature takes on heightened 
importance in such a market-driven, "contractual" context. The 
claims made in an attempt to attract students could also form 
the basis for claims of misrepresentation later on. In addition, 
since brochures, web sites, etc. may form the basis by which 
parents make decisions to send their children to a particular 
charter school, those sources may further define the duty the 
charter school. 
(b) Illegal or substantially improper use of charter school funds for the personal 
benefit of 
any officer, director, or fiduciary of the charter school. 
(c) Substantial and sustained departure from measurably successful practices such 
that 
continued departure would jeopardize the educational development of the school's 
pupils. 
CAL.EDUC.CODE §§ 47600- 47616.5 (West 1999). 
Similarly, Wisconsin lists the following: 
(a) The charter school violated its contract with the school board or the entity un-
der sub. (2r) (b). 
(b) The pupils enrolled in the charter school failed to make sufficient progress to-
ward attaining the educational goals under§ 118.01. 
(c) The charter school failed to comply with generally accepted accounting stan-
dards of fiscal management. 
(d) The charter school violated this section. 
WIS. STAT. § 118.40 (1999)/ 
92. For example, Arizona law allows non-renewal when the charter school "has 
failed to complete the obligations of the contract or has failed to comply with this arti-
cle." Revocation may occur at any time "if the charter school breaches one or more pro-
visions of its charter." ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 15-181 - 15-189 (2000). 
93. "[F)inancial mismanagement, [and] a violation of the charter agreement" are 
the other two. See "The Charter School Roadmap, September 1998" U.S. Department of 
Education. 
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school has assumed for particular student outcomes. 
For instance, the following mission statements were taken 
from charter schools' web sites. Note how each makes affirma-
tive statements about the abilities students will acquire at 
their schools. The first example comes from Horizons Commu-
nity High School of Wyoming, Michigan94 and the second from 
Renaissance Charter Jr./Sr. High School of Irving, Texas.95 
Horizons must provide up-to-date technology so that students 
can: 
• expand their knowledge bases; 
• improve their critical thinking, problem solving, and 
decision making skills; 
• access, analyze, evaluate and communicate informa-
tion in expedient, efficient, and creative formats; 
• work ethically, independently, and collaboratively 
with a diverse and changing population both within 
the classroom and school, and beyond-across school, 
state, national and international boundaries. 
Renaissance Charter Jr./Sr. High School faculty and staff in-
sure an environment of safety, respect, and accountability 
while students prepare to improve the quality of life in world 
communities. The school provides an equitable opportunity 
for students to acquire a sound academic and career-focused 
education. Students receive a strong foundation in humani-
ties, science, mathematics, and career technology. Interdisci-
plinary curriculum is presented in a way that is relevant to 
each student's world. Specialized support is provided for stu-
dents preparing for careers that require post-secondary train-
ing. Students will prepare to be full participants in the 21st 
century. Graduates enter the global labor force with market-
able skills while embracing positive work ethics. 
The following additional examples were taken from a web 
page designed by the Pioneer Institute to show those aspirinP, 
to start a charter school how to compose a mission statement. 9 ' 
94. Horizons (visited Jan. 17, 2001) <http://www.horizons.k12.mi.us:80/>. 
95. Cyberramp (visited Jan. 17, 2001) 
<http://www.cyberramp.net/-tomlong/renaissancel>. 
96. The institute describes itself as follows: "Pioneer Institute is a nonprofit, non-
partisan, Boston-based public policy research institute." Pioneer Institute For Public 
Policy Research (visited Jan. 17, 2001) <http://www.pioneerinstitute.org>. 
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The mission of the Lowell Middelesex Academy is to enable 
students to achieve academic, social and career success by 
providing a supportive community that identifies, encourages, 
and develops each student's interests and abilities .... Upon 
graduating from the academy, each student will have: 
• A high school diploma; 
• A clearly demonstrated set of academic skills; 
• Experience in the workplace and in community ser-
vice; 
• A clear awareness of their rights and responsibilities 
as citizens; 
• A personal development plan for the years beyond 
high school. 
The Neighborhood House Charter School of Boston believe[s] 
that the underpinnings of change rely on the creation of a 
learning community, where everyone has something to learn 
and something to teach .... The mission of the Neighborhood 
House Charter School is to develop in each child the love of 
learning, an ability to nurture family members, friends, and 
self, the ability to engage in critical thinking and to demon-
strate complete mastery of the academic building blocks nec-
essary for a successful future. 
The mission of YouthBuild Boston, Inc., a youth development 
organization, is to "provide disenfranchised young people with 
the academic, vocational, social and leadership skills they 
need to leave life on the street, rebuild their lives, and take 
responsibility for themselves, their families, and the revitali-
zation of their community .... The YouthBuild Boston Acad-
emy offers young people who have dropped out of school a 
hands-on, interactive, family-like learning environment in 
which to reclaim their education and prepare for a lifetime of 
continued learning and economic independence. The academy 
is designed for students who failed school or for whom the 
school system has failed." 97 
53 
97. Pioneer Institute for Public Policy Research (visited Jan. 17, 2001) 
<http://www.pioneerinstitute.org/csrdch2.html>. The Pioneer Institute also suggests 
that charter schools "Make sure that your mission statement is published in all your 
marketing and other literature, including handbooks, parent information forms, 
newsletters, student handbooks, and press releases." 
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In each of the five examples given, schools articulate vari-
ous promises to those who elect to send their children to them. 
Statements can be read to promise identification of problems, 
services to address problems, and various levels of student out-
comes including students' "complete mastery" of subject mat-
ter. Horizons Community High School even appears to promise 
to maintain "up-to-date technology." Of course, each of these 
promises begs the question, "what recourse do parents have if 
the school falls short of its promise?" 
Ill. EDUCATIONAL LIABILITY AND CHARTER SCHOOLS 
As reviewed earlier, some authors have argued that any 
traditional public school may now be held liable for failure to 
adequately educate the children in their care.98 Yet, these theo-
ries may be insufficient to overcome judicial reluctance given 
the long line of cases delineating concerns with claims of edu-
cational malpractice. However, those reservations may not be 
as visceral when applied to the special circumstance of charter 
schools. The particular characteristics of charter schools appear 
to make them especially vulnerable to renewed efforts to hold 
schools accountable through educational liability claims made 
in judicial settings. Based upon these special characteristics, 
claims using either a contract theory or statutory theory may 
now be viable causes of action against a charter school. 
A Using Contract Theory to Found Educational Liability 
Claims Against Charter Schools 
Charter schools are more susceptible to breach of contract 
claims than conventional public schools, because the charter 
school-parent relationship is inherently contractual in nature. 
Like universities and private schools, charter schools take a 
market-based approach that emphasizes competition and 
choice.99 Under such an approach, parents are consumers that 
use information provided by the charter schools to choose 
among various educational options. 100 Additionally, the charter 
between the school district and the sponsoring agency is con-
tractual in nature. In exchange for freedom from various state 
98. See supra note 1. 
99. Wall, supra note 5. 
100. !d. 
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regulations, the school agrees to enter into greater accountabil-
ity as defined by the charter. 101 Also, charter schools are re-
quired to describe their educational program in specific de-
tail.102 This requirement leads to the development of specific 
promises that can be identified in a breach of contract cause of 
action. 
Charter schools may be able to state a claim based on a 
theory of an implied contract because of the application and se-
lection process employed by charter schools. Parents apply to a 
charter school in writing that either accepts or rejects the ap-
plication by written notification. The offer of a seat and the 
parents' resulting acceptance could be viewed as mutual assent 
for the "bargained-for exchange" or consideration of the par-
ents' commitment to enroll their child in the charter school, 
thereby allowing the school to "claim" that child for the 
per/pupil funding provided through the charter statute. This 
process directly contrasts with traditional public schools where 
attendance is dictated by place of residence and arguably no 
such bargain exists. Of course, a court might conclude that a 
charter school would not be vulnerable to educational liability 
claims based on theory of an implied contract between the par-
ent and the school because the written contract exists between 
the sponsoring agent and the school. 
Parents may be better able to make either a third-party 
beneficiary claim, or promissory estoppel claim. An analysis of 
an actual charter school provision illustrates these points. The 
Bowling Charter School in Sacramento, California states that 
it uses an efficacy model, that, inter alia, challenges students 
in their "zone of development."103 The zone of development is 
defined as the area a little beyond the student's current abili-
ties and knowledge. 104 If a student is being educated beyond his 
zone of development, then he becomes frustrated. If his educa-
tional program is below that zone, then he becomes bored. 10;j 
The school also identifies strategies that it may use to help 
students get into and stay in their zones of development, in-
101. J. NATHAN, CHARTER SCHOOLS: CREATING HOPE AND OPPORTUNITY FOR 
AMERICAN EDUCATION (1996). 
102. !d. 
103. U.S. Charter Schools (visited Jan. 17, 200]) 
<http://www.uscharterschools.org/res_dir/res_primary/res_bowling.htm>. 
104. !d. 
105. !d. 
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eluding: (1) using the strong side over the weak side attribute 
theory; (2) using feedback to find each student's personal learn-
ing zone; and (3) developing and using a support group. 106 
If Bowling Green fails to conduct assessments to identify a 
particular student's zone of development, but placed that child 
in an inappropriate educational setting, then it is possible that 
the child might be able to articulate a claim based on a third 
party beneficiary claim. Like Ross and Squires, the charter 
contains a specific promise - that the school will use assess-
ments to determine the educational content and approach for 
an individual student-that can serve as the foundation of a 
breach of contract claim. Also, Bowling Green has contracted to 
perform a duty, educating students, that is required by the 
state's constitution and through its compulsory education stat-
ute. Additionally, the charter school has not contracted to per-
form a general duty, but a specific duty to educate those stu-
dents who are attending the charter school. If a court refused 
to find that a contract does exist between Bowling Green and 
the sponsoring agency, thus negating a third party beneficiary 
claim, the parent might be able to convince the court to apply 
the theory of promissory estoppel. This is because it is evident 
that the charter's promise to provide each student with an edu-
cational program within his zone of development would induce 
a parent to have her child attend Bowling Green, and that the 
school's promise was intended to induce that reliance. 
Furthermore, a court might find that the public policy prob-
lems identified in the conventional public school context would 
not exist in this hypothetical situation. First, an educational li-
ability claim based on contract would not immerse the court 
into the day-to-day operation of Bowling Green because, as is 
the case in breach of contract claims against universities and 
private schools, the court would merely have to determine 
whether the school has carried out the specific promise of using 
procedures designed to identify a student's zone of develop-
ment.107 
Second, the courts would not be subjecting Bowling Green 
and other charter schools to undue financial hardship because 
106. Id. 
107. See Ross, 957 F.2d at 417 ("Ruling on [a breach of contract] would not require 
an inquiry into the nuances of educational processes and theories, but rather an objec-
tive assessment of whether the institution made a good faith effort to perform on its 
promise."). 
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of the limited nature of damage awards provided by contract 
law. Unlike tort claims, which permit monetary awards for 
consequential and punitive damages, the remedy for breach of 
implied contracts and third-party beneficiary claims is gener-
ally limited to the injured party's expectation interest, or the 
amount that will place the person in as good a position as she 
would have been if the contract had been performed. 108 Addi-
tionally, the recovery under contract law is subject to three 
limitations: (1) the injured party may not recover damages that 
she could have avoided if she had taken appropriate action; (2) 
the injured party may not recover for losses that the party in 
breach could not have foreseen; and (3) the injured party may 
not recover damages for loss be~ond the amount that she 
proves with reasonable certainty. 1° Contract law is also advan-
tageous because if monetary damages are deemed unsuitable, 
then contract law permits specific performance -i.e., the ren-
dering of the promised performance. 110 If the court recognizes a 
recovery under the theory of promissory estoppel, the parent 
may recover her expectation interest (limited by foreseeability, 
of course), or reliance interest (the cost of the promisee to the 
detriment she incurred in reliance of that promise).m A court 
would probably choose the expectation interest because of the 
difficulty of computing the reliance interest. 112 Thus, in the case 
of the hypothetical situation, damages would be limited to the 
cost necessary to raise the student's academic performance to 
an acceptable level, as defined in the charter school's perform-
ance standards. The award could come in the form of monetary 
damages to pay for remediation, or if specific performance is 
the correct method of recovery, then the state or school district 
could provide remediation for the student. 
Third, the recognition of an educational liability claim un-
der contract law would probably not result in a flood of litiga-
108. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 33, at§ 12.1. 
109. ld., § 12.8. 
110. ld., § 12.6. 
111. Id., § 2.19. 
112. !d. Upon first glance it might appear that measuring the reliance interest 
would be easier than the expectation interest because the reliance interest would 
merely consist of choosing the charter school over another school. However, the reliance 
interest is made more complicated by the fact that the child also has to make an effort, 
in reliance of the promise made by the school, to make her educational program work. 
It would be difficult to compute this reliance interest. Consequently, a court may 
choose to use the expectation interest because this is much easier than reliance. 
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tion. One limitation is that the student's remedy would be lim-
ited to her expectation interest. Therefore, unlike tort law, the 
incentive for obtaining large damage awards does not exist. In 
addition, the number of breach of contract claims is limited by 
the fact that courts would recognize a claim only where a char-
ter school failed to fulfill specific promises - such as the place-
ment of students, or the provision of educational services. 
Fourth, although educational institutions have established 
administrative agencies to resolve disputes, the function of 
most of these agencies is to correct on-going educational con-
cerns, instead of redressing injury. 113 
B. Using Statutory Theory to Found Educational Liability 
Claims Against Charter Schools 
Similarly, statutory theory may provide a viable framework 
for asserting an educational liability claim. As mentioned ear-
lier, prior courts have been reluctant to find that statutory re-
quirements created any actionable obligation on the part of the 
states, both because of concerns for the definition of a "duty" 
owed and because of public policy concerns about using educa-
tional funds for remedies in such complaints. 114 Still, the appli-
cability of those previous cases diminishes when applied to a 
charter school context. Therefore, given the special features of 
charter schools, a new possibility exists for the construction of 
a statutory theory of educational liability. 
Charter school contracts and the statutes upon which they 
are based arguably shift the focus from that of describing "op-
timum educational results"115 to identifying and quantifying 
educational outcomes. Charter schools are the apex of an edu-
cational accountability movement that has been prevalent in 
state legislatures. Charter statutes rank with increased 
teacher certification requirements including teacher proficiency 
tests, defined state standards, and student competency, profi-
ciency, and graduation tests as measures enacted to hold 
schools and teachers accountable for student learning. 
In Cannon u. University of Chicago, 116 the Supreme Court 
113. McJessy, supra note 1. 
114. Peter W. 131 Cal. Rptr. at 854 (1976); D.S.W. v. Fairbanks North State Bor-
ough School District, 628 P.2d 554 (Alaska 1981). 
115. Peter W. 131 Cal. Rptr. at 862. 
116. 441 U.S. 677 (1979). 
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crafted a test to determine whether a federal statute made a 
remedy available to someone seeking to establish such a claim. 
Although any statutory theory of educational liability in the 
charter school context will be dependent on state rather than 
federal law, the factors established by Cannon are still instruc-
tive. They are: 
1) whether the statute was enacted for the benefit of a special 
class of which the plaintiff is a member, 
2) whether there is any indication of legislative intent to cre-
ate a private remedy, 
3) whether implication of such a remedy is consistent with 
the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme, and 
4) whether implying a federal remedy is inappropriate be-
cause the subject matter involves an area basically of con-
117 
cern to the States. 
For these purposes, the first three factors provide guidance 
for considering whether charter school statutes and contracts 
may be used to craft a cause of action for educational liability. 
Charter school statutes are created to benefit the special 
class of school-aged children by providing their parents some 
measure of independent choice without foregoing a state-
funded education. As noted in the above section describing 
charter schools, charter schools exist to promote accountability 
for student learning while at the same time working toward 
educational reform. Therefore, the statutes are not only de-
signed to benefit a particular group (school-aged children), they 
also define that "benefit" available under the law as an educa-
tion that has outcomes that are both measurable and account-
able. For example, one stated purpose of California's Charter 
Schools Act of 1992 is to "[h]old the schools established under 
this part accountable for meeting measurable pupil outcomes, 
and provide the schools with a method to change from rule-
based to performance-based accountability systems."118 Minne-
sota's statute likewise seeks to "establish new forms of ac-
countability for schools,"119 while the New Jersey statute pro-
poses to "establish a new form of accountability for schools 
117. Id. at 678. 
118. CAL. EDUC. CODE,§ 47601(D (West 1999). 
119. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 124D.10(a)(5) (West 1999). 
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[and] require the measurement of learning outcomes."120 Ac-
cordingly, it can be concluded that charter school statutes are 
designed to benefit school-aged children by providing them the 
means to obtain an accountable public educational experience 
of their parents' choosing. 
In addition, the charter school contract and statute that 
bind the school to stated performance objectives provide a 
measure of reassurance to the parents that the educational 
services purchased with the "voucher" will be quality services 
and will allow their child to make adequate (or better) educa-
tional progress. Furthermore, parents know that charter 
schools are subject to oversight and charter revocation if the 
programs do not deliver the services promised. Therefore, the 
parents rely on those reassurances to enter into the "educa-
tional experiment" that is a charter school. In so doing, they 
place their trust not only in a specific school, but also in the 
statutory scheme that created it. Consequently, charter school 
statutes define an expected level of service. That level of ser-
vice is further outlined by the particulars of the specific charter 
school contract. In that way, parents trust in the system to de-
liver an explicitly specified level of service. 
It is also important to note that parents, who elect to send 
their child to a charter school, enter into that compact for an 
individual child. Each voucher is calculated on a per/pupil basis 
and the parent is free to "spend" that individual voucher at 
whatever public charter or conventional school selected. There-
fore, even though statutes generally refer to charter schools' 
pupils in the collective, the entitlement purchased by the par-
ents with a voucher is an individual one. 
The second Cannon factor is the "legislative intent to create 
a private remedy." Charter school statutes already contain 
"remedies" of sorts. One collective remedy is revocation of char-
ter school status. Another individual parent remedy is transfer 
of their child from the charter school to the conventional public 
school or another charter school. However, these remedies pro-
vide no relief from "injuries" incurred by having placed trust in 
a school that did not deliver on educational promises. While 
courts are still unlikely to recognize a private remedy that al-
lows for punitive damages, a court may read charter statutes 
and contracts as creating a limited private remedy to allow the 
120. Charter School Program Act of 1995. 
35] CHARTER SCHOOL LIABILITY 61 
parents to recover their "investment" in the educational ex-
periment of the charter school. Or stated another way, courts 
may read the clear legislative intent to create a "new kind of 
accountability" as encompassing the private remedies of reim-
bursement of the voucher amount and compensatory education. 
Reimbursement and compensatory education have long 
been recognized as appropriate remedies in another educa-
tional context. Special education law includes a well-developed 
series of cases constructing remedies for a district's failure to 
adequately fulfill the statutory obligations of state and federal 
requirements. 121 Of course, there are significant differences be-
tween the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
(IDEA), 122 the state statutes enacted to comply with IDEA's 
mandates and charter school legislation. 
Most tellingly, IDEA establishes an individual entitlement 
to a "free appropriate public education"123 for each eligible child 
with a disability and specifies elaborate administrative proce-
dures to enforce that right. In addition, IDEA specifically al-
lows reviewing courts to "grant such relief as the court deter-
mines is appropriate."124 Charter statutes generally do not 
specify administrative or appellate procedures for parents dis-
satisfied by their child's charter school experience. Nonethe-
less, remedies under IDEA provide an interesting analogue for 
considering potential remedies under charter school statutes. 
Notice first that the duty owed to the children and their 
parents on their behalf under both IDEA and charter statutes 
both involve a specified level of service. In the case of special 
education, IDEA specifies a level of service (a free appropriate 
public education) that is further defined by the child's indi-
vidualized educational program (IEP). For charter schools, the 
charter statutes specify a level of service (measurable and ac-
countable progress toward established standards) that is fur-
ther defined by the charter school contract. Interestingly, "free 
appropriate public education (FAPE)'' has no unitary meaning 
121. See e.g., Burlington School Committee v. Department of Education, 471 U.S. 
359 (1985); Florence County School District Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993) (compen-
satory education); Jefferson County Board of Education v. Green, 853 F.2d 853 (11th 
Cir. 1988); Lester H. v Gilhool, 912 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating school district re-
sponsible for tuition reimbursement). 
122. 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. (2000). 
123. 20 U.S.C. §1401(d)(1)(A) (2000). 
124. 20 U.S.C. §1415(i)(2)(B)(iii) (2000). 
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but must rather be determined by examining the abilities and 
needs of an individual child with a disability. 125 In contrast, 
charter school statutes and contracts, as illustrated above, are 
quite specific when defining adequate educational services and 
progress. In that way, it could be argued that the duty owed 
under charter statutes is better delineated than is FAPE under 
IDEA. 
The Supreme Court's consideration of reimbursement as a 
remedy under IDEA provides further instruction. In School 
Committee of Burlington v. Department of Education, 126 the 
court was asked whether school districts could be ordered by a 
court to reimburse parents for tuition at a private school if the 
parents were able to show that the school district failed to 
make available a free appropriate public education for their 
child. In other words, could the parents be compensated for 
placing their trust in a system that did not deliver on its prom-
ise of a free appropriate public education? The Court held that 
such relief was ,rroper and refused to construe reimbursement 
as "damages."12 Rather, the court concluded that tuition reim-
bursement "merely requires the Town to belatedly pay ex-
penses that it should have borne in the first instance had it de-
veloped a proper IEP."128 
Applying this reasoning to the charter school context, the 
parents' investment in the charter school in the form of the 
voucher could be reimbursed if the parents could show that the 
charter school failed to deliver on the promises made in the 
charter school contract. Those promises might be broken by 
failure to provide promised services, failure to identify and rec-
ognize learning problems, and/or failure to provide proper as-
sistance once learning problems were recognized. Similarly, 
parents could receive a remedial award in the amount of the 
"voucher" they "wasted" on an educational environment that 
did not deliver. Such a court-ordered remedy would "merely re-
quire the [charter school] to belatedly pay expenses that it 
should have borne in the first instance had it developed a 
125. The Supreme Court defined FAPE as "reasonably calculated to enable the 
child to receive educational benefits" The Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 
458 U.S. 176, 184, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 3039 (1982). 
126. 471 U.S. 359, 105 S.Ct. 1996, 23 Ed. Law Rptr. 1189 (1985). 
127. 105 S.Ct. at 2003. 
128. ld. 
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proper [educational experience]."129 
An alternative to reimbursement under IDEA is compensa-
tory education. Compensatory education may consist of addi-
tional months or years of educational services beyond the 
statutory cut-off of 21 years or additional remedial services 
during the summer or after-school hours. As the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals explained, "imposing liability for compensa-
tory educational services on the defendants [school districts] 
'merely requires [them] to belatedly pay expenses that [they] 
should have paid all along."'130 As with reimbursement, com-
pensatory education is only available when the parents canes-
tablish that the school district failed to provide the expected 
free appropriate public education. 
Compensatory education may be an appropriate remedy in 
the charter school context as well. As an alternative to reim-
bursing the voucher amount, the charter school could be or-
dered to provide (either the school itself, or through funds) tu-
toring or other compensatory services to help the student close 
the gap between where the child is and where the child should 
be had the services been adequate. 
Both reimbursement and compensatory education mitigate 
the traditional public policy arguments against a statutory the-
ory of educational liability. They can both be calculated with 
defined amount and do not involve exorbitant punitive dam-
ages awards. Reimbursement compensates for known expenses; 
compensatory education compensates by providing prospective 
relief in the form of extended services. Compensatory education 
as a remedy might also be most applicable if the charter 
school's charter has been revoked. In that case, there would be 
no entity from which to collect damages. However, a court 
might order the state to grant a child so injured by a poor 
school the option of extending his/her formal education or fund-
ing compensatory educational services from another charter or 
conventional public school of the child's choice. 
The final Cannon factor examined here is whether a "rem-
edy is consistent with the underlying purpose of the legislative 
129. See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 359. 
130. Meiner v. Missouri, 800 F.2d 749, 750 (8th Cir. 1986). More recent cases order-
ing compensatory education include: State of Connecticut- Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. 
State Dep't of Educ., 699 A.2d 1077 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1997); M.C. ex rel. J.C. v. Central 
Reg'! Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 389 (3"' Cir. 1996); Punxsutawney Area Sch. Dist. v. Kanouff, 
663 A2d 831 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995). 
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scheme." Certainly, providing a limited private remedy for fail-
ure to adequately deliver on educational promises is consistent 
with the espoused purposes of charter school legislation. As 
noted above, charter schools were created in part to establish 
schools that were more accountable to parents and the public 
for the educational outcomes of students. Therefore, the use of 
reimbursement and compensatory education as educational li-
ability remedies would provide the kind of real accountability 
charter school statutes address as their purpose. In addition, 
these remedies make each charter school truly accountable, not 
only to the chartering authority and the general public, but 
also to individual parents. 
Also, charter schools are by definition designed to spur in-
novation. Accordingly, when parents enroll their children in 
charter schools, they are participating in an educational ex-
periment. Providing an individual remedy to compensate par-
ents for their willingness to participate in the state's experi-
ment seems only appropriate. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As the above discussion illustrates, it may be possible to 
craft a viable claim for damages resulting from a charter 
school's failure to assist a student to obtain the educational 
outcomes. Such a claim may be based on either a contractual or 
a statutory theory of educational liability. If such claims are 
realized, they will mark a new era where accountability is not 
just a platitude, but an actionable expectation. They also may 
open the door to other claims in more conventional public 
school settings. For example, if charter schools can be com-
pelled by courts to keep the promises they make, perhaps mag-
net schools that compete for students may also be so bound. Fi-
nally, if a traditional school's "competitors" are all subject to 
scrutiny for failure to provide adequate educational services, 
perhaps they too will come to be subject to the same judicial 
examination. 
